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TAB A

THE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN

1. The current Communist campaign charging the US with large-scale bacteriological operations against North Korea and Communist China began with a Communist New China News Agency report dated 21 February alleging that the US had used bacteriological warfare against North Korea in the period since 28 January. At this time no charge of the use of BW against China itself was published. (A statement of alleged "air violations" of Manchuria by US planes during the first two months of 1952, broadcast by Pei-p'ing on 20 February, made no mention of BW. However, it charged that several localities in Manchuria were subjected to conventional bombing and strafing attacks.)
2. The initial charge of 21 February was given unusual prominence on 23 February when Pak Honyong, the North Korean foreign minister, issued a lengthy protest against the alleged American "atrocities." On the same day the various "democratic" groups and personages customarily used in Chinese Communist propaganda campaigns began to issue "protests" against the alleged BW operations. On 25 February Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chou En-lai specifically seconded Pak Honyong's protest. The campaign was quickly picked up in other Satellite countries. In the Far East, the Viet Minh radio broadcast the charges as early as 24 February, although, to date, it has not amplified them into a major campaign.

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3. A new and ominous note was injected into the accusations on 6 March, when the Pei-p'ing radio charged that on 29 February the US had utilized bacteriological weapons also against Manchuria. This charge became the basis for statements by Chou En-lai and the official Pei-p'ing People's Daily to the effect that the US was using BW against Manchuria with the "obvious aim of wrecking the armistice talks in Korea, prolonging and expanding the aggressive war in Korea, and the instigating of new wars." These statements, subsequently amplified by other propaganda sources, threatened that American air force personnel captured while "invading" Chinese territory would be dealt with as war criminals. The statements called upon "peace-loving people" to "rise up" and upon US "Satellite" countries to protest against the "sinful designs" of the US Governments.

4. On 14 March the Pei-p'ing radio extended its charges to China proper by alleging that the US had dropped infested insects in Shantung Province near Tsingtao on 6 and 7 March 1952. Charges of BW against China proper have not been further amplified to date.

5. Although Communist-originated news dispatches have described epidemics of various diseases, including types involved in the BW charges, in several North Korean provinces and in some areas of north, east, and central China, at no time has an existing epidemic been specifically linked to the alleged BW campaign. The Communist news dispatches give no indication that the epidemics described are more extensive than those periodically expected in China and Korea.

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6. Following American proposals for an International Red Cross investigation, radio Pei-p'ing issued a strong denial that any epidemics had been caused by the alleged BW, stating that "epidemics have so far been prevented by the swift action of the authorities and the public." Pei-p'ing accused the US of trying to get the IRC into North Korea in order to "report on the effectiveness of germ warfare" and organized an international body of Communists to inspect and verify their charges.

7. Although the BW charges will have inevitable repercussions in the cease-fire negotiations, there has been no major effort to tie the charges into the propaganda concerning the talks, other than to charge that the US is delaying the talks in order to complete its alleged BW experiments and to state that the Chinese and Koreans must not be dissuaded from continued efforts to strike "still heavier blows" against the American "aggressors." Nor has the BW campaign been closely connected with the other themes of Communist propaganda in Asia. There has been no effort to connect the BW charges with the charges that the US is plotting aggression in southeast Asia, nor have the BW charges been linked to the Sino-Soviet alliance.

8. The charges of Japanese complicity in American BW research, which were prominent in BW propaganda campaigns in 1950 and 1951, have been repeated, but the Japanese have not been charged with participating

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directly in the actual dropping of infested vermin or insects. The only Chinese Communist propaganda statement that has linked the BW charges to the Sino-Soviet alliance was one issued on 10 March by the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in Pei-p'ing, which stated that "under the unity of China and the Soviet Union, any treacherous American scheme will be completely crushed." The absence of more prominent statements of this type in the present campaign is all the more remarkable in view of the extravagant emphasis given by Pei-p'ing to the strategic aspects of the Sino-Soviet alliance on the occasion of the anniversary of the Sino-Soviet treaty on 14 February.

9. Chinese Communist and North Korean propaganda has emphasized that "preventive" measures are being taken against the alleged BW campaign. In North Korea the Communist Military Committee on 20 and 29 February designated certain "danger zones" and ordered widespread anti-epidemic measures, including quarantine, inoculations, and sanitation measures, with communications priority for all "anti-epidemic information." In China "anti-epidemic teams" for Korea were organized in major cities, the first of which was reported to have arrived in Korea on 3 March. Similar teams were apparently formed locally for use in the areas of China and Manchuria subjected to the alleged BW attacks. In addition a Chinese Communist investigating commission has been dispatched to Korea, headed by Mae. Li Teh-chuan (Mrs. Feng Yu-hsiang), the Minister of Health of the Pei-p'ing regime.

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10. The BW charges have received what is probably the heaviest and most continuous propaganda coverage of any recent Chinese Communist propaganda campaign. Almost a quarter of all recently monitored items on the various regional Chinese radio services dealt with BW charges. The treatment accorded the subject by Pei-p'ing has apparently been roughly the same, whether directed at domestic or foreign audiences. The coverage in North Korea has been similarly intensive.

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CHRONOLOGY OF PRINCIPAL SINO-KOREAN PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS ON
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE

- 21 February First NCNA charge of BW used against Korea, itemizing alleged attacks between 28 January and 17 February.
- 23 February Statement by Pak Honyong, North Korean foreign minister, protesting against the alleged use of BW since 28 January against North Korea.
- First protests by Chinese Communist and pro-Communist organizations and individuals against the alleged BW, including the Red Cross Society of China. Editorial on BW in the Pei-p'ing People's Daily. Following this date, such protests became prominent in all Chinese Communist propaganda media.
- 25 February Statement by Chou En-lai, Chinese Communist foreign minister specifically seconding Pak' protest.
- 29 February North Korean Military Committee published anti-epidemic measures, including "Decision 65," adopted 20 February 1952.
- 3 March First anti-epidemic teams reportedly arrived in Korea from China.
- 4 March First mention of BW artillery in Korea.
- 6 March First NCNA report of alleged BW attack on Manchuria.
- 8 March Chou En-lai and People's Daily statements on BW attack on Manchuria.
- 12 March SSFA issued protest on BW with reference to Sino-Soviet "unity" -- only statement of this type to date.
- 14 March NCNA reported that disease-infested insects were dropped in Shantung near Tsingtao on 6 and 7 March.

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TAB B

DISEASE IN THE KOREAN AREA

1. Available intelligence does not indicate the present incidence of typhus, cholera, smallpox, typhoid and other diseases in North Korea. It is doubtful whether factual information on the incidence of each disease will ever be available since the diagnostic competency of the Chinese Communist and North Korean medical services is poor. Consequently, true current incidence of any given disease in the North Korean (and China/Manchuria) area is likewise not known by the Communists. However, the area contains the natural conditions causing many diseases to be endemic and epidemic.

2. Endemic diseases of military significance in the NE China - Manchuria - Korea area are given below.

(The importance of each is indicated by the following)

(symbols:)

(1 - Special Military Importance)

(2 - Potential Military Importance)

(a. Endemic Diseases)

(b. May be introduced)

(3 - Serious diseases not of military importance)

(but likely to affect small numbers of troops)

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<u>Disease</u>	<u>NE China</u>	<u>Manchuria</u>	<u>Korea</u>
Dysentery & Diarrheas	1	1	1
Endemic-louse	1	1	1
Typhus			
Endemic-flea	1	1	1:& scrub- mite
Venereal Diseases	1	1	1
Cholera	1	1	2a
Malaria	1	2a	1
Skin Diseases - Mycoses	1	1	1
Plague	2a	1	2b
Trench Foot & Frostbite		1	1
Dengue	1	2b	2b
Infectious Hepatitis	2a	1	
Schistosomiasis	1		3 ?
Relapsing Fever	2a	2a	2a
Papptaci Fever	2a	2a	2b
Epidemic Hemorrhagic Fever		2a	1
Jap B Encephalitis	2a	2b	2b
Filariasis	2a	2b	2a
Leptospirosis	3	3	3
Rat-bite Fever	3	3	3
Rabies			3
Cerebrospinal Meningitis	3		3
Leishmaniasis	2a	3	
Russian Spring-Summer Encephalitis		2b	

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3. Diseases historically follow the movement of armies, and there is every reason to believe this fact applies in the case of Chinese movement into North Korea. Moreover, hygiene and sanitary conditions in the NKF and CCF have become progressively more propitious for disease outbreaks as the Korean conflict has continued. Exhausting forced marches and inadequate food and shelter have lowered the resistance of the troops. Dirty mess-gear has been commonplace. Lack of medical equipment and non-utilization of sanitation personnel, even in rear areas, are evidence of neglect from a preventive-medical standpoint. The absence of an effective lousicide is another factor contributing to the generally primitive sanitary condition in the field (DDT is ineffectual against certain types of Korean and Manchurian lice).

4. During 1951, cholera, smallpox, and typhus were reported to be widespread among North Korean and Chinese Communist troops. Typhus fever had a high incidence among enemy troops during the spring; the rate fell sharply early in July. It was reported that in some areas of North Korea, 50% of all civilian communities contracted the disease, with a resulting 30% mortality. In March 1951 there were reports that typhus, typhoid, and smallpox had affected a large proportion of civilians and North Korean troops in the Ch'unch'on area; the mortality rate was reported

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to be 50%. In April 1951 the NKF and CCF disease victims were reported to equal battle casualties.

5. In November 1951 GHQ, FECOM concluded that "lack of an effective lousicide, together with the apparent neglect of universal typhus immunizations and the high louse infestation of enemy troops will inevitably result in many cases of typhus".

6. There have been several recent reports of an unusual disease in both the NKF and the CCF. The disease is characterized by an acute onset with headache, chills, and fever; nosebleed, vomiting, and abdominal pains were reported in some instances. While there was no mention of conjunctival hemorrhage (or "red eye") in connection with these reports, a large percentage of PW's were found to be suffering from some form of conjunctivitis at the time of capture. No estimate of incidence of the malady in enemy troops can be obtained.

7. There was one covert report of a smallpox-like disease epidemic in North Korea during November-December 1951; no confirming intelligence is available.

8. CCF Immunization. There is every indication that CCF troops have been more universally and more effectively immunized than is generally believed. Vaccines were plentiful in China and Manchuria prior to CCF intervention in 1950 and in Korea

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of 1951 (except for tetanus toxoid). Vaccines were all made in China and Manchuria at any one of a number of centers such as the Peking Central Epidemic Prevention Bureau and the Dairen Municipal Sanitation Center. No Russian or US made vaccines were used. However, there were no inoculations for typhus or for Japanese B encephalitis.

a. Smallpox: Vaccination was universal in 1950.

About 90% coverage of military forces was achieved in 1951. Ten percent were missed because of the unfavorable tactical situation and fear of being vaccinated.

b. Typhoid-Paratyphoid-Cholera: Combined vaccine.

Given in divided doses of 0.5cc, 1.0cc and 1.0cc at intervals of 1 week. Universal coverage in 1951 for the first dose, about 90% coverage for the second dose, and about 80% coverage for the third dose. The lack of universality of the last two doses may be ascribed to the unfavorable tactical situation.

c. Tetanus: Given in divided doses of 0.5cc, 1.0cc and 1.0cc at intervals of 3 - 4 weeks. Universal coverage in 1951 for the first dose, about 40% coverage for the 2nd dose, and 15% for the 3rd dose. The lack of universality of the last

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two doses may be ascribed to the unfavorable tactical situation and to a shortage of toxoid.

9. NKA Immunization. The immunization program in the NKA was far less universal during the first half of 1951 than in the CCF. There were no specific inoculations for tetanus, cholera or Japanese B encephalitis. It is estimated that 15 - 20% of troops received no immunization of any kind in 1951.

- a. Smallpox: Vaccination was universal in 1950. Only about 1/3 of troops were revaccinated in 1951.
- b. Typhoid-Paratyphoid: Combined vaccine. Given twice yearly in divided doses of 0.5cc and 1.5cc with a one-week interval. About 90% coverage in early 1950 and about 30% coverage in 1951.
- c. Typhus: None in 1950. Given in two divided doses of 1.0cc each to approximately 60% of troops between February and May 1951.
- d. Typhoid-Paratyphoid-Typhus: Combined vaccine given in divided doses of 1.0cc each to approximately 60% of troops in 1951.
- e. "Nisin-Baktin": This is the phonetic pronunciation of a Russian, combined vaccine that was given to approximately 80% of NKA troops between March and

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May 1951. Inoculation of one dose results in fever of three or four days duration. No fatalities resulted. As far as can be ascertained, the vaccine contained immunizing agents against the following diseases: typhoid, cholera, probably paratyphoid A and B, and tetanus or dysentery. The information concerning the use of this vaccine is reliable, but the list of diseases against which it is supposed to be effective is not reliable.

10. From current reports it appears that both the Chinese and North Koreans have ordered (at least on paper) plague and cholera immunizations for civilians as well as for troops: "Anti-plague corps are said to be carrying out emergency decontamination and epidemic prevention work in the front-line positions and villages affected. Epidemic prevention stations have been set up in germ-affected areas."

11. Military sanitation orders include the boiling of all drinking water, the burning of garbage and to the making of latrines in specified areas. Insect and rodent control measures have also been instituted. It is emphasized that while these orders exist on paper, it is not known how adequately they are carried out.

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TAB C

COMMUNIST BW CAPABILITIES IN KOREA

OFFENSIVE

1. There is no proof of Chinese Communist or North Korean biological research for the express purpose of waging biological warfare. Available intelligence of Communist BW capabilities in the Korean area is almost entirely concerned with possible CCF activities, although it must be assumed that some technical interchange takes place between Chinese and North Koreans.

2. Intelligence indicates that the Chinese Communist Government may have established a small, basic, and applied laboratory BW research program. This program is probably carried out in three scientific institutes located in North China and Manchuria. Research appears to be centered on enteric diseases of man and selected food-crop-killing hormones.

3. Top control of the BW research program probably rests in the "Chinese Communist Military Council"; technical assistance is obtained from specialists in the various research institutes. Control by the Council is exercised through three main scientific institutes in areas where the requisite laboratory facilities are already available for biological research. The principal institutes are at Peiping; (Peiping Scientific Research Institute); Chang Chun (The People's Army Chemical Warfare School and Research Laboratory under the Northeast Scientific

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Institute); and Peian (Paichia Special Diseases Research Institute). Other institutes possibly connected with the Chinese Communist program are located at Harbin (branch of the Continental Scientific Research Institute); Mukden (Cattle Disease Research Laboratory); and Dairen (the Dairen Sanitary Research Laboratory).

4. The Chinese BW program, intimately related to its CW program, is reported to be closely supervised and supported by the USSR. Soviet personnel participate as directors of the principal laboratories and as research scientists and technicians. As many as 50 percent of the technical personnel are reported to be Soviet, 120 Japanese specialists from the former Kwantung Army BW units have been put to work by the Chinese Communists.

5. Reported work of these facilities and scientists cover bubonic plague, typhoid, cholera, and other intestinal diseases. The Chang Chun institute has facilities closely associated with airfields; however, there is no evidence to confirm or deny actual employment of aircraft in munition or agent tests. Likewise, there is no evidence from the other research centers to indicate pilot-plant or large-scale BW production, field testing of agents, or development and test of BW munitions and equipment.

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6. Recent tests by the Army Chemical Corps have served to illustrate the ease with which limited targets can be attacked with BW agents. In view of the results of these tests, it seems probable that the Communists could, in limited areas, sabotage South Korean crops, wells, municipal water systems, and populated point targets with BW agents.

DEFENSIVE

7. BW defensive capabilities are closely tied to the public health system, medical facilities, and medical supplies. In China and Korea all three are very poor. The Communists are attempting to improve these in their basic public health program; such improvement, when realized, will be of value in combating BW.

8. The Chinese Communist Government announced in 1951 an expansion of epidemic control and prevention units, and expenditure of large sums for medical and sanitation work. Although inoculations against contagious diseases have been reported, it is doubtful if a significant percentage of the population has been protected. Many CCF PW's in Korea report inoculations are incomplete or entirely omitted. The Soviets have been aiding and advising the Communists in China - Manchuria particularly as regards prevention and control of plague; whether this Soviet interest is primarily benevolent or is associated with the BW program is not known.

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9. It is possible that Soviet developments in BW equipment and munitions might be made available (at least in design) to the Communists in Korea if it was determined that BW should be employed. However, in view of the Communists' relatively poor defensive capability vis-a-vis US defensive capability, large-scale employment of BW with Soviet munitions, agents, and the necessary concurrent air superiority, is considered highly unlikely.

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